As I mentioned at the end of Part 1, depending on the type of talent they start with, teams need to develop a strategy to have the best performing side on the park, for the least amount of outlay.

This can take a variety of forms, and in reality each team’s approach is as unique as the players who take the field. However, certain trends have developed, and these are particularly evident in those successful, deliberate methods implemented over several years, often in those teams that always seem to find themselves in the finals. I’ll discuss three such strategies below.

An approach proven incredibly successful in recent years has been to spend big on what’s described as the spine of a football team; the hooker, both halves and the fullback. This strategy allows the players with the biggest pay packets (and ideally the most talent) to be touching the ball the most. There are few better examples out there than the Melbourne Storm. Admittedly the Storm have often had a up and coming or unheralded five eighth (Gareth Widdop before he was a star, Ben Roberts, Blake Green as examples); still the class in the other three positions (Slater, Cronk, Smith at 1, 7 and 9 respectively) is ludicrous and can’t be denied. Subsequently, since the great salary cap scandal of 2010 was revealed, a significant portion of the Storm salary cap has always been tied up in boat purchases these three players, resulting in a relatively weakened remaining roster. However, it should also be noted that each season Melbourne have also had the benefit of at least two or three players outside of this Big Three with representative experience – Will Chambers, Adam Blair, Jesse Bromwich, Ryan Hoffman to name a few. Nonetheless the dominant class in their spine is the story here, and the success of the Storm is a testament to this strategy’s effectiveness.

Left to right: Huey, Dewey and Louie

Another approach that has seen continued success is the strategy involving the recruitment of a strong half or halves, and equally strong forward pack. This, of course, in turn leaves a relatively weakened backline, with role players generally manning numbers 1 through 5. However, in this strategy, the logic suggests that if the dominant forward pack can develop momentum and space, a quality half can put moderately good line runners into holes to create points. This approach is also a significant boost on the defensive side of the ball as the larger forward pack both prevents opposition momentum, and can cover a weaker defensive player’s ineffectiveness. As you have probably worked out, this approach describes and has been employed by the North Queensland Cowboys in recent seasons, headed by the best player on the planet in Jonathan Thurston, and the evergreen brutality of his forwards in Matt Scott, James Tamou, Ben Hannant, Gavin Cooper, Jason Taumalolo and the unheralded Scott Bolton (when you write down all their names, it’s actually ridiculous how good their forward pack was/is). Although reasonably successful (and famously unlucky a couple of times in finals vs Manly’s Hand of Foran in 2012 and the Sharks’ 7^th tackle try in 2013), it should be noted that only last season did they finally break through to Premiership glory, when the rest of their spine was similarly brilliant (Michael Morgan, Lachlan Coote and Jake Granville in particular; sorry Rory Kostjasyn, I’m just not sure what it is you do). However you slice it, the Cowboys have enjoyed a good run in with the current team make up, with a start in each of the past 5 finals series, and of course tasting premiership success in 2015.

Rory Kostjasyn – Rugby League’s answer to Where’s Wally.

This third method might look a little more unorthodox than the two above, but has proven potentially very successful. Cast your minds back to the 2012 season and the side the Canterbury Bulldogs fielded for much of that year. If you’re struggling, let me name their forward pack for you – Sam Kasiano, Frank Pritchard, Dale Finucane, Greg Eastwood, Aidan Tolman, Josh Jackson and a young bloke called Marty Taupau. Nothing to sneeze at, and there’s one name I haven’t mentioned, and I’ll get to him in a moment.

In 2012, my most despised of NRL teams also had the freakishly talented Ben Barba at the height of his Dally-M winning powers, the insidious Mick Ennis held the hooking role, and the always handy Josh Morris played well in the centres. But – most importantly you might ask, who were the halves? Trent Hodkinson was in the middle of one of those seasons where injury meant he barely touched a football, Josh Reynolds had figuratively just come out of the NRL womb and a lot of their play ran through a bloke called Kris Keating. No offence to all the Keating brothers and sisters out there, but he’s never been a half to lead a team around the park.

So how did the Bulldogs find themselves on a 12 game winning streak, taking out the minor premiership, and eventually going down to the Storm in the big dance by only 10 points?

One reason.

A big white English bloke called Graham. James born-to-be-a-Bulldog Graham. He is a one man advertisement for salary cap strategies needing to be built on strength of the roster in front of you. Des Hasler was effectively handed this team, but he didn’t panic at the lack of half talent, he instead changed his game plan to exploit his strengths – mainly the aforementioned gigantic 120kg halfback who wore the number 10 on his back.

The Bulldogs pet plays involved gigantic, mobile forwards running to the line and offloading, a strength not afforded to most forward packs in the competition, and one only allowed by Des’ relatively slim spending on his halves. This would allow both space and an overlap to develop for a competent backline to take advantage. It was out of the box, unexpected and wildly successful. Sure, it didn’t hurt to have a world class fullback doing freakish things (sound familiar?), nor did it hurt having an experienced captain leading the side. But this team would have been nowhere near as successful if strategies (both salary cap and game plan wise) weren’t adapted to fit the players within it.

Shake what your momma gave you.

Take a moment and to consider the salary cap strategy implemented by the Parramatta Eels, both in 2014-2015 seasons, and more importantly what it might look like this season. I will cover this discussion in Part 3.

Then in the final instalment Part 4, I’ll answer questions relating to the current form of the second tier salary cap, what it’s purpose is, and what happens when injuries strike a first grade side. Feel free to post these questions below.

Go you Eels,

Mitch

Part 1

Part 3

Part 4 (coming slightly less soon)

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